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Introduction 
he global governance of collective issues or “global public goods” has currently 
reached a crossroads. On the one hand, indisputable elements of crisis testify to 
the difficulty in governing globalization by means of concerted standards and 
rules (Tubiana, Lerin, 2003) – as seen in the postponement or laborious progress of 
multilateral negotiations, whether environmental (climate, biodiversity) or trade-
related (WTO Doha round). On the other hand, the “objectivization” of specific 
global problems ensures that these problems develop an unprecedented consensus of 
knowledge and interest, which confirms their importance. This is particularly so for 
the climate issue (Stern, 2007), for the Millennium Development Goals (especially 
poverty and health) that we know will not be reached, and for security issues (nuclear 
proliferation, nuclear terrorism). “The paradox of our times can be stated simply”, says 
David Held: “the collective issues we must grapple with are of growing extensiveness 
and intensity and, yet, the means for addressing these are weak and incomplete” 
(Held, 2006: 240). 
 
For Europe this situation is most worrisome. Logically and by necessity, it has 
championed a system of collective action based on norms and regulations in exchange 
of which its members have partly given up sovereignty. A wait-and-see policy of falling 
back on national interests is especially dangerous for this European conception of an 
international system. The active contribution of these new political and economic 
powers to global governance’s revival is of major importance to the European Union, 
as opposed to the United States who can easily make do with the assertion of national 
sovereignties. Therefore it is up to Europe to be proactive in inventing a new 
international contract, balanced in terms of rights and responsibilities. It should 
define a coherent and incentive policy to deal with these emerging powers, rather than 
pose as an ethical power while simultaneously defending, most of the time, its 
economic interests. 
 
A question posed to Europe by the emerging countries could be formulated as follows: 
what would it take to have the emerging countries partake in the solution? In this 
paper, we analyse some aspects of the problem before sketching some solutions. 
Problems indeed differ according to environmental aspects of emerging countries 
growth (first section), the macro-economic consequences of such a growth (second 
section), or the equity concern emerging countries loudly express in negotiation fora 
(third section). 
 
T 
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The environmental deadlock 
In 2005, and for the first time since the turn of the XXth century, the emerging 
economies’ share in the sum total of the wealth produced worldwide has crossed the 
symbolic threshold of 50% (measured in purchasing power parity). India’s growth rate 
is approximately 6% in real terms; its projected growth during the next decade is 
deemed greater, so that India should eventually become the world’s third economic 
power between 2020 and 2025. China’s growth, 2 points higher in average and more 
extroverted, is given more media coverage owing to its impact on world trade. China’s 
share in American importation has increased from 6% in 1995 to 15% in 2004. 
China total trade in goods grew at an annual rate of 24.5 % during the 10th Five-Year 
Plan period (2000 to 2005), and the target set for the 11th Five-Year Plan period 
(2006-2010) is to increase its trade in goods from US$142.2 billion in 2005 to 
US$230 billion in 2010. The OECD expects China to surpass the USA and 
Germany and become the world’s first exporter as early as 2010. China’s share in the 
world’s demand for raw metals has risen from 5-7% in the early 1990s to over 25% 
today. China has the second largest foreign exchange reserve of approximately US$ 
700.  
 
Carrying on with the current trends is not sustainable for energy security reasons 
 
Neither demographic giants that India and China are, with 40% of the world’s 
population, can expect to develop and bring an extra two billion inhabitants to the 
middle class’s consumption level in the old industrialised countries on the basis of the 
USA’s or even Europe’s development model. 
 
The growing resort of emerging economies (except for Brazil) on oil and gas leads first 
of all towards a dead-end. Even under “equilibrium” scenarios where investments of 
the oil and gas industry are fully deployed, the demand projections put emerging 
economies and the rest of the world in front of a risk of physical scarcity and of energy 
prices between 80 and 100 dollars per ton (World Energy Outlook, 2006). This 
avenue is obviously not sustainable even without taking into account the political 
tensions a supply race would generate.  
 
The generalized resort on coal, whose reserves are abundant in Chine and India, is 
neither a simple solution for substitution. The social costs of local pollutions and 
logistic transport problems make coal a costly and investment-intensive solution at 
large-scale.  
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Carrying on with the current trends is not sustainable for global environment 
 
Carrying on with the current trends of fossil energy consumption (including coal and 
oil) that underlie this development model’s large scale expansion would lead to 
scenarios where climate change risks become exponential. 
 
China is gaining the first rank of the most CO2-emitting country. By 2030/2050, 
according to the International Energy Agency, if the current energy consumption 
trends continue the greenhouse gas emissions should reach 40 giga tonnes of CO2 
equivalent for the whole world. In the laissez-faire scenarios, the emerging countries 
would account for half of the world emissions in 2030 (approx. 17.5 giga tonnes of 
CO2) and for more than half in 2050. Expressed in terms of emission per-capita, they 
would remain way under industrialised countries, but as a whole, owing to their 
choices and development needs, they would represent half of the problem and thus half 
of the solution. 
 
In 2030, at this level of emissions, the greenhouse effect gases will have accumulated 
to such an extent that global warming presents great risks of reaching more than 5°C.  
Such changes would alter the entire world’s physical geography. Even at lower 
warming levels, more than a billion people would suffer from water shortage, that 20% 
to 50% of species would be threatened with extinction, and that approximately 
200,000 million people would become economic refugees (Stern, 2007). 
 
The impact of global warming is an immediate threat to emerging countries 
themselves. Tropical or subtropical and dry zones that represent a large part of the 
lands in emerging countries will suffer more than temperate zones.  
 
An energy changeover is therefore absolutely required (giving up fossil fuels, 
developing an energy-saving economic model), to stabilise climate at a moderate level 
of global warming (a 2°C rise of temperatures); a global warming already inevitable, 
even if very significant reduction efforts are made (Jacquet  and Tubiana, 2006).  
 
 
Unprecedented pressure on natural resources 
 
Although this growth’s impact, in terms of natural resource exhaustion, pollution, 
public health and economic or social costs, bears in the first place on emerging 
countries themselves, its consequences are also global. 
 
These are primarily the upshot of the rapid growth rates of the demand in raw 
materials. The drop of prices in manufactured goods boosts the world’s consumption 
of raw materials processed by intensive labour economic systems. Let us consider for 
instance the consumption of tropical woods (processed for the smallest cost in 
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emerging economies), with deforestation’s negative externalities endured by supplier 
countries and the planet at large. 
 
China’s quest for natural resources (including timber, oil, base metals as well as 
agricultural products) and overseas investment in support of meeting these needs have 
become frequent topics in the global media. China has often been portrayed as 
responsible for negative global developments beyond its borders. However, in some 
cases (e.g., timber/furniture, cotton/textiles), it is not only China’s own consumption 
that drives the resource demand. For example, over half the value of China’s exports is 
derived from imported components and raw materials. A Stanford University study 
pointed out that the import value of Chinese exports to the USA is as high as 80% 
(Lau, 2003).1 This means that China acts as the workshop to the world, processing 
raw materials to produce the final products. This would imply that responsibility for 
sustainability and environmental concerns lies with consumers in the importing 
countries as much as with China. 
The macro-economic uncertainty 
The challenges concerning the emerging countries’ macroeconomic policies, and 
specifically China’s, are very carefully scrutinised. Beyond the fact that these countries 
are eminently heterodox (Stigliz, 2000 ; Santiso, 2006), one salient feature of their 
growth model lies in its macro-consequences at global level. A « macro shock » cannot 
be discarded for at least three reasons (Reisen, Grandes et Pinaud, 2005). Firstly, the 
authors state, China may now be regarded as a price maker on some international 
commodity and energy markets. Hence, China should not just be perceived as a 
producer of low priced goods, but likewise of “cheap savings”. Secondly, the 
prospective rise in institutional savings, fed by demographic trends and switches from 
PAYG to funded pension systems, together with the need to achieve decent capital 
returns despite the headwinds of shrinking labour forces in the OECD area, can be 
expected to intensify the macroeconomic effects of business cycles in both OECD and 
non-OECD areas. Faced with low returns, pension-fund strategy committees and 
individual investors have been increasingly turning to hedge funds, searching for 
uncorrelated asset classes with a focus on absolute (rather than benchmark-oriented) 
returns. These new actors may require policy attention as they have probably 
introduced amplifiers to global credit cycles, with potentially harmful effects to both 
capital-importing countries and investment returns in capital-exporting countries. 
Third and last challenge, Asia’s high-reserve policy and limited exchange rate 
flexibility, which has permitted an accommodative US monetary stance, singled out 
the Euro as adjustment variable, and which clearly been causing problems in Asia, not 
                                                   
1 Lawrence J. Lau. 2003. Is China Playing By the Rules? Free Trade, Fair Trade, and WTO 
Compliance. Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hearing, Washington, D.C. Sept 24, 
2003. 
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only through trade friction, but also by exacerbating the country’s accelerating 
liquidity growth/overheating economic growth problems.  
 
We could add a fourth element, which concerns the wage rates, and the possible 
pressure to lower these wages that the Chinese labour force reserve on the one hand, 
and the competition introduced in an increasing amount of professional activities on 
the other, could bring about (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), for the skilled 
labour as well as the unskilled. Let us recall economist Richard Freeman’s question: 
“Is your wage set in Peking?” and the controversies on the consequences of 
outsourcing on the USA’s real incomes (Samuelson, 2004 ; Bhagwati, Panagariya, 
Srinivasan, 2004). The prospect of the conjunction of new technologies widening 
competition and trade from products to tasks (and therefore from sectors to individual 
workers) and the arrival on the labour market of a large “mass” of Indian and Chinese 
workers with a broad range of skills leads to giving more slack to the prediction of the 
convergence speed of wage rates throughout the world, and to the prediction of the 
extent of the wage drop some workers in rich countries might have to face. All these 
items will be part of the deal emerging and non-emerging countries will or should be 
willing to make.  
 
The quest for equity  
 
Most global governance institutions are now at the end of a cycle, but since the post-
war period (Bretton Woods Institutions, GATT) and the Earth Summit (Rio 
conventions on climate, biodiversity and desertification) enjoyed a legitimacy acquired 
through the singularity of the event that triggered their creation (World War II and 
the environmental alert – especially climate alert – respectively). Today these 
institutions are seeing their goals and their results challenged, and their mandate 
questioned: this is the case for the IMF, which was weakened initially following the 
financial crises in South East Asia (1997) and Russia (1998), then today by the 
Chinese and Brazilian trade surplus; it is also the case for the World Bank concerning 
the performances of its strategic poverty reduction programmes; and also for the 
WTO, concerning its ability to put liberalization to the service of development, but 
also for the OECD DAC, which Chinese investment has circumvented ; and finally 
also for the Rio conventions, for which the possibility of a renegotiation is questioned. 
 
The institutional governance cycle launched after World War II and partly redefined 
after the Rio Earth Summit is drawing to a close with the question of the 
compatibility of development models: compatibility of development models with 
sustainable development goals (provided these have been clearly defined), but also 
compatibility between countries. Such a question is not new. But it has received 
renewed attention due to the pivotal position of emerging countries: as “developing 
countries,” they call for exemptions and alleviations of the requirements to preserve 
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global public goods; as “large countries” in demographic terms, they dispose of growth 
capacities large enough to catch up with Europe within a couple of decades, but with 
unsustainable impacts that are already occurring and/or may very shortly be 
comparable with those of rich countries. To (re)gain legitimacy, governance 
institutions need to solve a thorny equation: they are asked to bridge the development 
gap between countries (i.e. to encourage the catching up process) while drastically 
reducing the gap between the readjustment’s impacts on the environment and 
sustainable development more generally. The trade and climate change negotiations 
are striking examples of this issue. 
 
Fairness in trade  
 
The creation of the WTO exemplifies this double legitimacy and the difficulties it 
entails. The Preamble to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization includes direct references to the objective of sustainable development 
and to the need to protect and preserve the environment. It states that WTO members 
recognise that “their relationships in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising living standards, ensuring full employment and a 
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding 
the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of 
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to improve the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different 
levels of economic development.” Giving priority either to economic development or 
environment’s preservation is left to the discretion of the different countries “with 
differing levels of economic development.”  
 
Yet actually accounting for this legitimacy, and not merely asserting it, is challenging. 
Under the pressure of Brazil, South Africa and India, among other developing 
countries, the current WTO negotiation round (originally the “Doha Round”) has 
been renamed the “Development round,” with the explicit ambition of increasing the 
share of world trade liberalisation gains accrued to developing countries. In spite of the 
progress—be it uneven—made since the round was launched 6 years ago, negotiations 
are in a deadlock. WTO members seem incapable of negotiating a trade agreement 
“favourable to development.” Three main reasons can explain this.  
 
The first, which seems very simple, is that no clear and consensual criteria have been 
defined to assess whether or not the outcome of trade negotiations is “favourable to 
development.” Oddly enough, neither the Gatt nor the WTO has addressed the 
question seriously, as shown by the fact that neither has bothered to define what a 
“developing country” is. Any WTO member country can claim to be a developing 
country provided that no objection is made by another member. In the negotiation 
process the lack of clear-cut definition has tremendous implications on the arguments 
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and positions of member States, and particularly of developed countries. While some 
NGOs such as Oxfam for instance support a broad definition of “developing 
countries” (non-OECD members, in short), others suggest  differentiating emerging 
countries from lesser developed countries among the whole set of “developing 
countries.” Hence some among the French delegation were overheard questioning the 
agricultural trade negotiation package, insofar as CAP tariffs would be drastically cut 
and would be unfair in benefiting primarily to large land owners in emerging 
countries. Without consensus on beneficiaries, no agreement can be reached. The 
equity issue has been made clear, but no appropriate answer has been found yet. 
 
The second reason lies in another absence of consensus, this time on the expected 
effect of trade openness on development, providing the term is actually defined. While 
most economists share Samuelson’s (1939) view that some trade is better than no 
trade, no scientific statement, with scientific value on par with the comparative 
advantage theory, provides “true and non trivial” predictions on the effects of trade 
openness on development. Largely, admittedly, because development remains a tricky 
concept to define and measure. Attempts to substitute “growth” to it have not proven 
decisive. Comparative advantages which predict instantaneous gains to any (small) 
country opening up its trade, says nothing about dynamic gains and growth. And 
growth theory, focusing on innovation, human capital or research and development, 
does not make either export or import enter its equations. Trade theory is silent about 
growth and conversely growth theory about trade. No consensual knowledge, liable to 
guide public policies toward a defined objective (Haas, 1980)—trade liberalisation in 
this particular case—was available to make the trade and development linkage 
operational in WTO negotiations (on this point see Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005 ; 
Rodrik 2007).  
 
The last reason is inferred from the aforementioned. Considering the absence of a 
theoretical link between trade and development, empirical studies and numerical 
simulations have multiplied over the last six years. What has been observed over the 
last six year period is increasing competition among economic research staffs on trade 
impact simulations according to various “development” criteria such as country GDP, 
poverty headcount ratio or real wage in specific industries. OECD and World Bank 
trade models are no longer the main players in this field (see for example the ICTSD 
symposium on trade models, 2005), their results being sometimes even sharply 
questioned and criticised (Bureau, Jean, Mattews, 2006 ; Voituriez, 2006). And the 
gains from trade derived from competitive simulations and model refinements seem to 
shrink inexorably. What we know from all these studies on the impact of trade seems 
rather trivial: there are gainers and losers from trade liberalisation; this is true at 
country level as well as household level; in some cases, the poorest are the losers, but 
in some cases only. Lastly, there should be gains for all, but some (households and 
countries) will have to wait a bit (Chabe-Ferret, Gourdon, Marouani, Voituriez, 
2006).  
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Equity in negotiations on climate change 
 
The negotiation on climate change has shown the limits of a wrong perception of the 
problem and of its solutions. 
 
The Kyoto protocol’s hypothesis, based on a fair allocation of emission rights, 
connected to a market mechanism that should minimize abatement costs of CO2 
emissions, has not worked properly.  
 
Industrialized countries, « responsible » for the past accumulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, were expected in principle, once ambitious objectives were fixed, to carry 
out massive financial transfers towards developing countries, fulfilling both interests 
and establishing between the North and the South solidarity. The underlying 
conception of Kyoto’s equity turned out to be impracticable, mostly because countries 
tend to have a preference in financing domestic action and making local profit, rather 
than operating a significant transfer (Colombier, Kieken, Kleiche, 2006).  
  
As for developing countries, they are unenthusiastic about a restrictive quantified 
agreement: curbing their emissions that could limit their access to energy, and thus 
stifle their development. With a limited prediction capacity on future emissions that 
an international regime could impose on developing countries, some countries fear 
that the agreement would involve a sharing of emissions on a “de facto” mode, whereas 
today, developed countries account for half of the world’s emissions but only one sixth 
of the population.  
 
Some ideas have been developed and refined which enable to obtain a better 
perception and reduce some uncertainties. It is particularly the case for the objective 
of climate stabilization and the division of the efforts on the long term: the hypotheses 
generated from the prospective model exercise in response to the objective of 
stabilization of GHG, outline a growth perspective of emissions on mid-term for 
developing countries. To check climatic changes at a reasonable level, countries with 
medium incomes should, by 2050, return to their 1990 level of emissions whereas 
other countries could operate a reduction by 2 or 3 of their emissions with respect to 
this same level of reference. In the same time span, the emissions of developed 
countries should be divided by 4.  
 
The aim to stabilise GHG concentration at an ambitious level may be achieved by 
granting different regions of the world varying margins of evolution adjusted to their 
initial situation. The immediate and necessary action for emerging countries is 
justified with respect to their interest by two reasons: energetic, urban and industrial 
infrastructures which will determine the consumption of energy during the next 
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decades are not yet constructed and constitute a major economic opportunity. Also, in 
terms of urbanism, transports or energetic efficiency there exist a broad range of 
beneficial actions to the climate which allow the emerging countries to sustain the 
development process.  
  
From this analysis, two main elements should be stressed. The first is that equity has 
a critical place in today’s discussions on global issues. The second is that legitimate 
governance will be difficult to achieve if the difficulty to define common criteria of 
equity remains. It will be only possible by globalizing the different points of 
negotiation to make the different visions of equity compatible, and by organizing some 
“trade-offs” between various fields. This approximation will only be possible with a 
common vision of the problem and a shared vision of the end result, and flexibility, 
which should allow the different countries sufficient autonomy to experiment their 
policies and reduce the social cost generated by the change of situation. 
 
 
Making emerging countries part of the solution 
The uncertainty on the possible technological evolution in response to the climate 
change challenge, as well as the controversies concerning the impacts of growth in 
emerging countries in the fields of macroeconomics, energy or health, make scientific 
knowledge and ideas crucial to the issues of global governance inherent raised by the 
emerging countries. Global governance theories present a very large framework for 
behavioural comprehension and analysis of state and non-state actors that rely on 
power and force but are not confined to these limits (Keohane and Nye, 2000 ; 
Mayntz, 2002 ; Hira and Cohn, 2003/04 ; Held, MacGrew, 2006). Two important 
basic models are usually employed to understand the phenomena of coordination: 
collective action models, based on utilitarian conjectures deriving from the theory of 
rational choices, and the models of social practices which consider that the interests 
and preferences of actors are not given facts. In this case, they must be analyzed 
independently in order to understand the way the actors perceive and in return 
influence their environment. In particular, according to this last approach, there is no 
objective or naturalist definition of goods common to humanity, for whose 
preservation the States among other actors have a rational interest to cooperate. No 
more than there is a given balance of power that could explain the absence of anarchy 
and the stability of hegemony. Thus, for E. Haas (1990) and J.G. Ruggie (1998), two 
additional variables governing the distribution of power must be taken into account: 
social goals and knowledge, both closely related to the preferences expressed by the 
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international relations actors on various subjects. This last approach could be the 
framework to carry out the following priorities of action, resulting from the above 
analysis.  
 
Concerning the climate, the build up of a common knowledge has proved to be more 
necessary than efficient: as shown during the G8+5 summit, the first step in the 
renewal of the 2001 negotiations is an agreement on a quantified emission goal in the 
long term.  
 
The debate must focus on the long term. The challenge is to perform, within the next 
century, an industrial revolution and to do so with the varying rhythms of each 
country on a global scale. The long term goal, to be feasible, should convince the 
economic actors that the climate problem is structural to their investment policies. 
The possible agreement with emerging countries is no longer to “share” the burden, 
but rather to build a partnership based on a new model of development and growth, on 
the investments to perform and their financing.  
 
The technologies of this revolution are already partly available and could be rapidly 
disseminated if adapted public policies were applied. New technologies will also be 
necessary, for which a clear political signal is critical in order to accelerate their 
development. However, technologies will not be sufficient if they are not followed by 
structural changes in the demand of energy, in particular concerning the building 
industry, urban infrastructures and transport.  
 
The Bush administration objects to the European approach based on quantified 
emission goals for all countries and a greater commitment of industrialized countries 
than emerging countries. It prefers a “bottom-up” approach based on the 
acknowledgement of national efforts freely decided by each government. The weak 
point of Europe is that emerging countries are interested in the American arguments 
because they defend the principle of sovereignty.  Its strong point is that nobody 
seriously believes that voluntary approaches, even at a global level, will be sufficient to 
curb emissions. Therefore, the challenge for Europe is to adjust its approach to 
emerging countries and support the options that protect their vital interests while 
actively contributing to the solution of the climate problem.     
 
Under which conditions can a partnership be elaborated?  
 
Concerning the industrialized countries, it is primarily rules that are required. 
Important restrictions to the emissions of industrialized countries will create an 
important demand of credits on the carbon market, but without a minimum of rules 
in a context of intense competition in some sectors, there cannot be either transfers or 
investments from industrialized countries towards emerging countries. Imposing a 
structural change in the development model to a large part of the world’s industry may 
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only be possible if similar rules are applied in other regions of the globe. If not, an 
expansion of “ecologic” outsourcing could occur, rendering null and void a partnership 
agreement. Therefore finding an agreement is essential to promote investments and 
technology transfers including on the carbon markets of emerging countries. This 
agreement requires the implementation in emerging countries of coherent public 
policies in the field of energy, albeit without short term quantified objectives. It is 
within this framework that we must consider the linkage between commercial rules 
and climate policy issues.  
 
As for the emerging countries, the participation against global warming and to the 
production of other global public goods means that these countries are fully integrated 
as responsible actors of the global system and that they accept their status. Therefore, 
the question of equity of treatment in the global system becomes an essential point for 
cooperation, so does the linkage between the fields of negotiations to be undertaken: 
technology, investments and trade. 
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Conclusion 
We have focused throughout this paper on two cross-sectional issues which are 
trade liberalisation and climate change. Several broad implications can be derived.  
Firstly, the cooperation possibilities of countries depend upon their capacity to 
create issue-linkages between various fields of international action. They also depend 
upon the capacity of the governance regime to compensate for countries’ sovereignty 
partial abandonment in precise fields, with what can appear, in other fields, as 
security, autonomy or economic gains.  
The issue-linkage is also the result of growing interactions between the various 
aspects of issues which all stem from globalisation. The competition in world market 
leads – or means – also competition between social models of collective preferences. 
World market integration requires a common policy framework to organise the 
compatibility between different public policies. There lies the difficulties to make 
effective a governance regime based on rules; there lies also the need to combine 
flexible approaches with shared and common objectives.  
The structure of the governance system is in itself affected by all this. The quest for 
global deals requires the creation of restricted groups capable to negotiate and 
conclude agreements. These “global deals” negotiated within clubs occur between both 
private and public actors. The creation of such clubs is at the heart of the relationship 
between emerging and Oecd countries.  
Operational clubs do not make universal consensus superficial and useless. The 
governance within clubs creates the basis for the definition and implementation of 
global policies ;  the resort to a universal framework for discussion is necessary to 
support a shared understanding of common objectives to attain for sustainable 
development.  
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